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THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITS OF 
THE RETRIBUTIVE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 
by 
KURT BAIER 
In textbooks on punishment one usually finds four major "theories" or "justifi­
cations" of punishment: (1) the retributive, (2) the deterrence, (3) the reform or 
rehabilitation, and ( 4) the incapacitation or social defense, theories.! They are 
usually offered as rival theories of the proper (primary) purpose or function of 
punishment.2 And it is generally assumed that the general practice of punishing 
people and individual acts of punishment are morally justified if and only if, and to 
the extent that, they serve that purpose or perform that function. 
During the fifties and sixties, the most popular theory both among social sci­
entists and philosophers was, I think, the rehabilitation, and the least popular the 
retributive theory. 3 During the last 5 years or so, however, with the growing con­
viction that there were no known effective measures or rehabilitation,4 and with 
the steadily rising figures in violent and other crimes, the popular and professional 
moods changed. More attention is now paid to the interests of actual and potential 
victims of crimes.5 Moreover social scientists have come up with evidence, rather 
dubious in my opinion, but widely publicized, that significant reductions of crimes 
could be achieved by increasing the certainty and the severity of punishment. 
Theorists divide over whether this reduction is better achieved by way of the inca­
pacitation or the deterrence effect of imprisonment. 6 And to some extent these 
aims of imprisonment involve different imprisonment strategies. Thus, the social 
scientists who believe in imprisonment for incapacitation believe that the impor­
tant crimes, crimes against the 'person (violence) and against property are com­
mitted by a fairly small proportion of the population who engage in a career of 
crime, between the ages of about 20-35 or so. Only incapacitation will stop them.7 
Deler.rentists on the other hand believe that a large number of criminals commit 
crime for the benefits or gains, whether material or psychic, which they hope for 
from criminal acts and that they can therefore be deterred by the knowledge that 
crime will not yield them these benefits.8 The problem group are the 1st-offenders, 
for more than half of them do not repeat crimes. Should 1st-offenders be dealt 
with lightly or severely? Should we let them off lightly, thereby failing to incapaci­
tate the 50% who will become recidivists but keeping prisons freer for the hardened 
cases and avoiiding the risks of turning 1st-offenders into hardened criminals by the 
association with other hardened criminals? Or should we punish them severely, 
with the converse results? Can we perhaps tell which 1st-offenders will become re­
cidivists and if so, is it just as well as .expedient to treat them differently?9 
While among social scientists the most popular theories now appear to be inca­
pacitation and deterrence, among lawyers and ph ilosophers, as well as, I guess, the 
general public, there seems to me a distinct anti-utilitarian and to some extent a 
pro-retributivist trend, I want to talk about this revival of and new interest in the 
retributive theory, and offer a few hunches about its attractions. 
I shall, for clarity, distinguish between Pure and Impure Versions of Retributi· 
vism. The Pure Theory hoMs that the practice of punishment and any individual 
act of punishment is moral�y justified if and only if it conforms to all four of the 
principles of retributivism: 1 O 
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(a) All those convicted of a wrong-doing or crime deserve punishment; 
(b) only those convicted of a wrong-doing or crime deserve punishment; 
( c) the severity of the punishment should not be less than the gravity of 
the crime; 
( d) the severity of the punishment should not be greater than the gravity 
of the crime. 
On this view, all punishment and only punishment which conforms to these prin­
ciples is deserved, therefore just, and therefore morally justified. The theory ans­
wers both (i) the question of what justifies punishing anyone, namely, that all 
wrong-doers deserve moral condemnation and deprivation of certain rights, and 
therefore should be punished, and (ii) the question of the extent to which they 
should be punished, namely, as much as they deserve, that is, as severely as their 
wrong-doing merits. 
Impure theories are either what I shall call negative or positive versions. (i) Neg­
ative Retributivism accepts principles (b) and ( d). It is offered by bu.mane authors, 
such as H.L.A. Hartll in opposition both to the Pure theory which adopts also 
(a) and (c), and to utilitarianism which ignores even (b) and (d). It rejects the Pure 
theory because it wants to allow utilitarian considerations to take the place of 
principles (a) and (c). It allows that it is right for some wrong-doers.not to be pun­
ished at all or not as severely as they deserve, if thereby a lot of good cap be achiev· 
ed or evil avoided. 
And it protects us against utilitarian governments who may wish to punish some 
who have not yet committed a crime but are predicted to commit them or to pun­
ish them more severely thal,l they deserve (indeterminate sentence, parole discre­
tion, etc.).12 
Positive Retributivism13, by contrast, allows that for the good of society it may 
be necessary to violate principles (b) and ( d), but insists that principles (a) and 
( c) must never be violated. 
I shall concentrate on the Pure Theory. I want first to show how very plausible 
this theory is. It seems that we need only to examine carefully · the nature of 
punishment in order to become convinced of its soundness. 
What, th�n, is punishment? Punishment involves two main roles, recipient and 
imponent, and something, a deprivation, which the recipient suffers normally at 
the hands of the imponent. Finally, there is some condition (e.g., the commission 
of a wrong, a crime, or an offense) such that the deprivation suffered by the recip· 
ient amounts to punishment if and only if he suffers it on account of such a condi· 
tion. It must also be mentioned that given cases of punishment may be flawless 
(deserved, just, effective, justified) or flawed, and that if we attempt to state the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of something being punishment, we must dis­
tinguish between those of flawless punishment and those of punishment whether 
flawed or flawless.14 
Let me now say a few words about each of these points to show how plausible 
it is to interpret them in a way that supports the retributive theory. 
(i) The core: Being punished consists in undergoing something normally 
unwanted. Receiving money could not therefore count as being punished, even if 
one hated it. Conversely, the fact that, let us say, imprisonment happens not to be 
unwanted by the person on whom it is inflicted, does not ipso facto disqualify it 
from being punishment. O f  course, we may want to say that it is then flawed: 
perhaps unsuitable, perhaps ineffective, and so on. 
Punishing. someone consists in imposing on him something normally unwanted. 
38 
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What is imposed must be intended as something unwanted: one cannot uninten­
tionally or accidentally punish someone,15 but it would be unintentional punish­
� if what iis inflicted were not intended as something normally unwante�. Pun­
i.shment is a deliberate punitive measure and so must be intended as something 
deprivatory and so normally unwanted. 
(ii) The relation between the two roles: Suffering something normally unwant, 
ed cannot be suffering punishment unless it is suffered at the hands of someone 
who inflicts it as something unwanted. The fact that someone deserves his suffering, 
does not by itself make that suffering punishment_. Even if the suffering is "his own 
doing" and he deserves it-if as we say "he had it coming to him,,--this is at best 
punishment in an extended or loose sense; as when a judge decides not to punish 
for larceny ,-.on the grounds that "the culprit has been punished enough already",­
someone who as a conseque,nce of an affair with his boss' daughter has lost his job, 
his wife, and his self-respect, and has been forced to steal to keep alive.16 
(iii) The social context: Punishment consists in something, deliberately depriv­
ing someone, which is prima facie wrong, but yet the word 'punishment' implies 
that it is something which is not prima facie wrong. Wherever the imposition of a 
deprivation is exhibited as punishment we take it to be prima facie justified, unless 
it is flawed (unjust) punishment. This means that those of the punished pelSOll's 
rights must be suspended which would otherwise be violated by the deprivation. 
In primitive societies, the suspension of rights is the only thing the society can 
manage to organize: the actual deprivation is left to individual initiative. When a 
person is outlawed., any other person may kill him and none of the duties of mrutual 
aid apply to him. In more highly organized societies, the suspension of the individ­
ual's rights is only relative to the organs of punishment. The fact that a person has 
been condemned to death does not give anyone (except the executioner) the right 
to kill him. 
This suspension of rights is always for a specific time; only in extreme cases is it 
permanent. The notion of expiatjon or atonement which is traditionally attached 
to the concept of punishment implies that during the time the punishment (the 
suspension of rights) lasts, the recipient is not a member in good standing, but when 
the punishment has been "served", he is received back into society as a member in 
good standing. This is true not only of legal punishment, but also of all other forms. 
The child under punishment is not a member in good standing in his family and, 
in so far as the society at large approves of the punishment of children by their 
parents, the child is not a member in good standing while he serves his punishment 
also in the larger social context. 
(iv) · Moral disapproval: Joel Feinbergl 7 has recently revived the idea18, for 
some time ignored under the influence of Legal Positivism, that for the imposition 
of deprivation to be punishment it must express the moral disapproval or condem­
nation by the imponent of the conduct for which the deprivation is imposed. A 
system which attaches penalties to breaches of rules and then imposes those penal­
ties on all and only on people whom it has found guilty of a breach of the rules, 
looks like a system of punishment but is not unless the imposition of penalties at 
the same time signifies moral condemnation by the imponent. If this is sound, as 
I think it is, then it shows that the idea of punishment is essentially at home in 
motality rather than in law, even if it is true that the law is among other things the 
enforcement of morality. This point is important, as we shall see more clearly below. 
Both punishment and penalization must be distinguished from the social imposi­
tion of some burden, such as the heavy excise many states impose on smoking and 
drinking. These impositions differ from punishment and penalization in that they 
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leave the individual morally free to choose between the course which carries cer­
tain pay offs as well as state-imposed burdens and the course which carries neither 
the pay offs nor the burdens. It would be wrong to think of this tax as a punish­
ment or penalty for smoking or drinking (though someone opposed to smoking 
and drinking may well say that the penalty of, not for smoking, is lung cancer, of 
drinking, cirrhosis; this is a prudential warning against these practices, not a threat 
of reprisals) since most states count on people going on smoking and drinking as 
sources of state revenue. To speak of some imposition as a punishment or the 
imposition of a penalty is to imply that people are not (or generally are thought 
not to be) morally free to make such a choice, though of course they normally can 
choose what they are not moraHy free to do. Punishment expresses permissive mor­
al condemnation of the conduct punished and is therefore inconsistent with a posi­
tive attitude of the imponent towards its recurrence or continuation, while taxation 
is perfectly compatible with it. 
(v) "For" something: There is fairly general agreement that if someone's suf­
fering of a deprivation at the hands of another is to be punishment, then there must 
be something on account of which the deprivation is imposed, something it is for. 
Somel9 have taken this to lbe merely a point about the meaning of the word 'pun­
ishment', others20 interpret it to mean that punishment cannot be just and there­
fore not justified, unless it is inflicted for something which is capable of providing 
such a justification. 
a) The definitional point is settled comparatively easily. We can say 
that no deprivation can be punishment unless it is imposed on someone only after 
he has been properly found to satisfy the condition for which the system of punish­
ment imposes it. This does not mean that the punitive system, say the parental one, 
must have spelled out in detail what these conditions are, but there must be some 
understanding on the part of the recipients of what these conditions are. The sys· 
tern is flawed to the extent to which this is not true. In a crude "common law" 
system, the only developed legal function is that of judge, i.e., of the official who 
"finds" (authoritatively determines) whether or not someone has broken the law. 
But this does not mean then because there is no legislator who has spelled out the 
rules, the people do not know, at least roughly, what these rules are. 
From this it  plainly does not follow that a person suffers punishment only if he 
actually satisfies these conditions. What does follow is that it is not deserved pun­
ishment if he does not. If the imponent made a mistake in judging that the accused 
did satisfy the condition, then there was a miscarriage of justice. Nevertheless, the 
imponent meted out punishment and the recipient suffered it. 
It also follows that if the accused is found not guilty, that is, if the judge's or 
jury's verdict is 'Not guilty',. then an imposition of deprivation after that cannot 
be punishment. It is not even a misca.rriage of justice, but naked, blatant, shameless. 
mistreatment or victimization or something of the sort.21 
But what about the imponent's state of mind? Can the imposition be punish­
ment if the imponent does not believe that the recipient is guilty (or believes that 
he is not) but pretends to believe it? I think it is punishment if the other conditions 
are satisfied. But it is punishment so seriously flawed that it amounts to victimiza­
tion: victimization by deliberately wrongful punishment, though its being 
victimization is now concealed from the public.22 Thus, K.B. Armstrong2 3 
in a mu�h-quoted article which was one of the first in the Retributivist revival, says 
that this is a mistake because it would include cases such as those of an innocent 
man who had been found guilty by a court that had meticulously observed formal 
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court procedures, been sentenced to death and been executed, hence such imposi· 
tions were cases not of punishment but of something else, perhaps victimization. 
Similarly, John Kleinig,24 says "deliberately to impose unpleasant treatment on a 
person knowing full well that he has not committed ·any offense (even though he 
may have been 'alleged' to have committed an offense or may even have been for· 
malty 'found guilty' of an offense) is not to punish him, but to victimize, take ad­
vantage of, bully, persecute, tyrannize, or � him (and perhaps others) for 
various ends, and ID cover this up by making it look as though he is being punjs�d." 
It seems that both of them must think that nothing can be both punishment and 
victimization, for otherwise the fact that these are cases of victimization would not 
show that they are not cases of punishment. But this is a mistake. 
It may perhaps be thought that .Punishment and victimization must be incom­
patible, for this reason: if it is known that the imposition is victimization, then it 
cannot be punishment, hence no one who knows or believes that it is victimization 
can consistently believe that it is punishment, hence those who are ignorant of its 
being victimization merely believe, wrongly, that it is punishment until they dis­
cover that it is victimization. But the analogous case of a miscarriage of justice 
should make us suspicious of this argument. The fact that someone discovers that 
an imposition is a miscarriage of justice does not show that it was or is not punish­
ment. Plainly the crucial question is who can know what and when. 
The imposition may be punishment even if at the time the whole moral commun­
ity (except the court) knows that it is a miscarriage of justice, but.not if they know 
it is victimization. And it can be punishment in both cases If they find out only 
later: then it was and of course always will be a case of a miscarriage of justice or 
victimization as well as a case of (flawed) punishment. 
That this can be so is explained by what should by now have become obvious, 
namely, that what makes the imposition punishment is that it is a "branding" of 
the recipient as one who satisfies the conditions of punishment (commission of an 
offense, crime, or wrong), on account of which he deserves the community's moral 
condemnation and the deprivation of certain rights. This "stigma" can, of course, 
be put on wrongly, whether by mistake (miscarriage of justice) or deliberately 
(victimization). But this is beside the point: it is punishment if he has been branded 
If everybody knows at the time that he is innocent and that the court knows this 
too, then, there is only the unsuccessful attempt at "branding" him. If the commun­
ity discovers the fraud only later, then the attempt was successful. The unmasking 
of the fraud does not undo the punishment, it merely reveals it to have been wrong· 
ful. If he is "branded" by a miscarriage of justice, then he has been punished even 
though everybody (except, of course, the court) knows that he was "branded" by 
mistake. 
The "branding" is thus a rather complex one. Success is not simply a matter of 
convincing the moral community that the recipient really was guilty, for he can 
get branded even if they know he is innocent (the case of miscarriage of justice). 
Nor is it simply the uttering in the appropriate context, of the magic formula "we 
find you guilty" for he does not get "branded" when the whole community knows 
he is innocent (the case of victimization or travesty of justice). I think the pro­
nouncement of the magic formula in the appropriate context normally suffices to 
"brand" the recipient but it can fail to do so, namely, in the abnormal case when 
the whole community knows (or for good reason believes) that the court proceed­
ings have been a travesty of justice, that the formula "we find you guilty" was 
fradulently applied. 
·There is, however, a further question, namely, whether what the imponent of 
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the deprivation is doing to the recipient amounts to punishing him i.f the- imponent 
himself knows or believes the recipient innocent. It is natural to think that if the 
imposition amounts to punishment, then it must amount to ·punishing. But this 
need not be so. One of the reasons why this is overlooked is a confusion between 
two things. The first is that no one can suffer punishment unless ·his deprivation is 
deliberately imposed by someone (as I said above, under1(ii)), hence no one can 
suffer punishment unless he is punished by someone, i.e., deliberately has imposed 
on him by that person a deprivation amounting to -punishment. The second is that 
under certain· conditions; someone's deliberately imposing a depirvation on some­
one amounts to his punishing him. The two may" be logically unconnected: It may 
be the case that even though Jones is being punished by Smith, Smith is not ipso 
facto punishing Jones, just as (perhaps) Jones may be lying to Smith (if in order 
to decieve him he tells him something he thinks untrue) without Smith's being lied 
to by Jones (if what Jones tells him is in fact true). Whether or not the two are 
logically connected, depends on whether a person (logically) can punish another 
when he believes him not guilty. Consider the case of Jones who believes that his 
favorite daughter has broken the window, but then inflicts (what he had said would 
be, or now says is) the penalty for breaking windows on his stepson whom he dis­
likes but, mistakenly, thinks innocent of the misdeed. We might then want to say 
that the stepson suffers deserved punishment at the hands of his stepfather (because 
Jones is -deliberately imposing the deprivation on the pretense that his stepson has 
broken the window) but might nevertheless insist that Jones has not punished him 
for breaking the window (or anything else) since he does not believe him guilLy. We 
might want to insist that when Jones says "I am punishing you for breaking the win­
dow" this is false as well as being a lie, but also that if he had said "You are being 
punished for breaking the window", it would have been true, though even then 
Jones' remark would be dish·onest or even lying. 
Finally, it should be noted that in the case of legal punishment, where there is a 
division of labor between prosecutor, jury, judge, and actual administrator of the depri­
vation (executioner, prison warden, etc.), there is no longer a single punisher and so 
the simple question of what the punisher must believe if his imposition is to count 
as his punishing the recipient is no longer applicable. We can no longer find a 
straightforward answer to the question, 'Who punished him?'. The punishing is a 
cooperative enterprise involving the playing of many parts, any of which may be 
performed faultily without necessarily preventing the recipient from getting pun­
ished, i.e., getting the stigma of guilt attached to him. 
For these reasons I am more confident of the truth of (i): that the deliberate 
imposition of a deprivation when the recipient has been properly found guilty 
normally amounts to punishment of him, than I am of the truth of (ii): that no 
imposition can be punishing someone unless the imponent believes the recipient 
guilty or (iii): that (ii) is incompatible with (i). 
b) The second, substantive interpretation of what punishment must be 
.f�r, the one advanced by the Retributive Theory (R.T.), claims it to be something 
capable of providing a justification for what is prima facie wrong, namely, imposing 
a deprivation on someone. This explains why, despite the fact that punishment con­
sists in a deprivation which is prima facie wrong, the fact that this deprivation is for 
that thing, punishment is prima facie right. "If we see a mother beating her child, 
it is usually sufficient for her to answer the question 'Why are you doing that?' 
(a question asked to ascertain whether what she is doing is right or wrong) with 
'I'm punishing him'."25 Teleologists, such as deterrentists, incapacitationis.ts, or re-
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habilitationists, by contrast take punishment to be justified if and only if it takes 
a form in which it does in fact adequately promote their preferred end. But sup­
porters of R.T. can muster a number of telling arguments against all such teleo­
logical theories of the proper function of punishment. In the first place, if what 
justified the imposition we call punishment were that it was an imposition by which, 
as in compulsory vaccination, the recipient or as in quarantine, the people around 
him, can alone or best be protected from harm, then whether and to what extent a 
given punishment is justified would be discovered by what twns out to be its conse· 
quences: if execution for petty thieving is more effective as a deterrent or incapaci­
tant, then it would neces8fil'ily be more justified than less effective punitive mea­
sures. Secondly, it would then be sensible to look for more effective alternatives 
of achieving these ends than punitive measures, say, paying them large sums of 
money, so that they would not be tempted to commit their crimes. But 'it simply 
does not make sense to look for non-deprivatory, non-punitive forms of punish· 
ment. Unlike quarantine, punishment is not an evil that is necessary only as long 
as we do not know better ways of achieving certain ends, such as deterrence, etc. 
Supporters of R.T. infer from this, not unreasonably, that the justification for 
punishment, i.e., for imposing deprivations as punishment, must lie in the very 
thing that punishment is w, not in something to be achieved by the deprivation. 
For only then can we know whom to punish and how much, and whether the 
punishment is justified, quite irrespective of how it turns out. 
The question then arises what sort of thing it is that punishment is for. The three 
main candidates are offenses,,_ crimes, wrongs. Under the influence of legal positi­vists, such as John Austin,2t> who want to sever law from mor�ity, even some 
retributivists27 have said that punishment is for offenses, breaches of social. rules. 
But this is not a plausible view because the fact that someone has committed an 
offense, i.e., a breach of a social rule, is not itself a justification for imposing a de­
privation. What makes it plausible to say that it is, is the underlying assumption 
that societies prohibit conduct whkh, for adequate prior reasons,_ they ought not to 
engage in. 
The second candidate, crimes (or even misdemeanors), meets this point. How­
ever, it does so only if it is not defined, the way it often has been under the influ­
ence of Legal Positivism, as whatever is forbidden under threat of  the criminal sanc­
tion. For when so defined, this candidate, crimes, is open to the same objection as 
the previous one, offenses. What makes crimes more plausible candidates is that by 
'a crime' we ordinarily mean something that is wrong as well as prohibited under 
threat of the criminal sanction. To call someone a criminal is to condemn him mor­
ally, which implies that one thinks his behavior morally wrong. Of course, typically, 
conduct is prohibitM because it is believed wrong and when it is prohibited, it 
normally also is generally believed wrong. But this is not always so. Many now 
believe that certain types of conduct are wrongly held to be crimes, are not really 
crimes, and therefore should be "decriminalized", e.g., the so·called victimless 
crimes.28 
But even when interpreted in this morally loaded way, the candidate remains 
open to a telling objection. Not all punishment is for crimes: parents, teachers, 
bishops punish those under their authority but not for crimes. R.T. is thus naturally 
driven to the third candidate, moral wrongs. And in this, the commission of a 
moral wrong, R.T. finds a genuine justification for the deliberate imposition of a 
deprivation on the wrong-doer. If punishment is such an imposition on someone for 
a moral wrong he has committed, then it is justified because that is what is due to 
him, his desert, 29 "because the vicious deserve to suffer". 30 
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Thus, on R.T., justifiable, because just punishment is some wrong-doer getting 
the deprivation he deserves. 
Now if this is a correct account of the nature of punishment, then it does seem 
plausible to say that punishment is just and therefore justified if and only if it 
satisfies the requirements of R.T. For if punishment necessarily involves the impo­
sition of deprivations, then two matters require justification: the imposition of any 
deprivation at all, and the imposition of deprivations of a certain magnitude on a 
particular person. R.T. provides the first justification by allowing punishment only 
in cases of moral wrong-doing. It then relies on the plausible, though unexamined 
intuition, that membership in good standing in a moral community is rightly made 
conditional on refraining from wrong-doing, and that the deprivation imposed in 
punishment is the price exacted from the culprit for receiving him back into the 
community. This is the basis of the deep conviction many people have about the 
propriety of demanding that criminals be made to expiate or atone for their crimes 
by suffering, that only punishment can "wipe out" the crime, and so on. R.T. is 
also capable o f  explaining and justifying our current moral conviction that punish­
ing, although it consists in doing what is prima facie wrong, namely, imposing a 
deprivation on someone, nevertheless, because of what it is imposed for is prima 
facie right. . 
R.T. provides the second required justification by insisting that punishment is 
(prima facie) justified if and only if it is just, that is, accords with the four princi­
ples of retribution. 
R.T. thus rests on an implicit contractarian conception of the moral order. We 
can bring this out as follows. On R.T ., punishment is the activity of bringing wrong­
doers to justice, that is, meting out to them what they deserve, namely,deprivation. 
They deserve this because all members of a moral community are required, as the 
price of the advantages conferred by membership, to refrain from doing wrong. 
Those who refuse to pay this price are excluded from membership in good standing, 
for a period depending on the gravity of their moral wrong-doing, in the worst cases, 
permanently. 
II 
I want now to re:verse my argument and weaken the hold of R.T. by showing 
that its central claims rest on an assumption seldom (if.ever) discussed which, when 
brought into the open, is far from plainly true and indeed is no longer even particu­
larly plausible under the conditions of contemporary industrial societies. 
As we have seen, the central contentions of R.T. amount to the following: 
(1) Every community has a right or duty to exact, as the price of continued 
membership in good standing, a certain amount of suffering or deprivation from 
"culprits"-! use this term as neutral between offender, criminal, or wrong-doer. 
(2) The severity of this deprivation ought to correspond to the gravity of the 
"misdeed" (offense, crime, wrong), measured i111 terms of the harm done and the 
degree of culpability of the culprit. 
It is. plain, however, that these lwo claims are plausible only against the 
background of a further tacit assumption: 
( 3) The only justifiable response to (misdeeds) is punishment, i.e., bringing the 
culprit to justice, i.e., giving him his deserts, i.e., branding him as a culprit, express­
ing the community's moral condemnation, and depriving him of his good standing 
in the moral community for an adequate period of time. 
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As long as crimes (or other misdeeds) are linked to punishment as their only 
appropriate sequel, the only appropriate question to ask will therefore seem to be, 
'What justifies punishment?'. But when answering that question, we are led, almost 
inescapably, by the very meaning of 'punishment�, to embrace R.T., rather than any 
of its supposed rivals mentioned on p. 1. For since the proper meaning of 'punish­
ment' is, as we have seen, the branding of someone as a culprit, his deprivation and 
his moral condemnation for his misdeed, its proper primary function31 must be to 
bring the criminal to justice, i.e., to give him his desert, and so the justification of 
punishment in each and every case must be that it is a just deprivation, one he de­
serves, that is, one in accordance with the four principles of retributive justice. The 
other possible functions of a social response to crime, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
incapicitation may therefor,e be incorporated in a penal policy only as secondary 
functions, that is, to the extent t�at penal strategies designed to carry out these 
policies do not come into conflict with the proper primary function of punishment, 
namely, bringing the criminal to justice. The concentration on punishment as the 
only possible social response to crime keeps before our eyes primarily the fate of 
the person to be brought to justice. Therefore the question uppermost in our minds 
when we ask whether the social response to a crime was justified is whether it was 
just punishment, that is, whether it was a just branding, condemnation and depriva­
tion of the person to whom the punishment is administered, i.e., whether it was 
just to him, and (perhaps) to his victim. What is not before our eyes is whether the 
punishment which brings justice to these persons also is just to others involved, 
above all his and others' potential victims. 
During periods when the crime rate is low, and so any representative (randomly 
chosen) citizen has a rather low expectation of becoming a victim of crime, peoples' 
concern with crime reduction will tend not to be great. They may then be satisfied 
with social responses to crime which do justice to the actual victim and the criminal. 
But in a period of rising crime, the representative citizen will become more con­
cerned to have social measures designed to reduce crime and increase his security. 
(People living in safe areas may, of course, continue to remain unconcerned about 
potential victims.) If this aim is pursued within the confines of the principles of R. 
T., the currently acceptable forms of punishment (e.g., imprisonment or fines, but 
not flogging, hard labor, bread and water, mutilation, and so on) may become very 
costly, perhaps more costly than the community is willing to pay for. In such a case, 
the total deprivations "ideally" to be meted out are reduced by lowered "clearance 
rates", 32 plea bargaining, suspended sentences, paroling, and the like. As a conse­
quence, a decreasing proportion of criminals are brought to justice and the crime 
rate continues to rise. Developments such as these suggest that bringing the criminal 
to justice is and perhaps ought to be our primary concern only as long as other con· 
cems, such as the cost and the criminogenic effect of doing so remain acceptable. 
Despite all this, it would appear that R.T. continues to have a strong grip on many 
people. The demand to have criminals brought to justice persists despite the unwill· 
ingness to pay the costs. 33 Philosophers, by casting their opposition to R.T. in the 
form of "rival. theories (justification) of punishment" have contributed to the con­
tinued fixation on retributive justice. 
It seems to me therefore that what philosophers should ask is not the traditional 
question� 'What is the justification of punishment?', which as we have seen, very 
plausibly leads to R.T. For this answer is then wrongly taken to imply (by way of 
the implicit assumption that the only proper social response to crime is punishment) 
that the sole primary function of any social response to crime must be bringing the 
criminal to (retributive) justice. What we should ask is, rather, "What is (are) the 
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proper function(s) of social measures in response to crime?' When the question is 
put in this way, it does not (improperly) close the possibility that the ultimate 
primary function of a social response to crime is crime control or crime reduction. 
Of course, this large topic cannot be treated on this occasion . 
One thing, though, which can and ought to be examined here is the central R.T. 
claim that the "culprit" deserves to suffer, i.e., that it would be morally fitting or 
appropriate if he suffered, and that this claim is based on a deep-seated and widely­
held intuition. I want to bring to light what is sound and what unsound in this 
claim. I want also to offer a few speculations about why so many people find even 
the unsound part of this claim plausible. 
Let us begin with an example given by Kleinig.34 Thirty years after World War 
II, a Nazi who has fled and managed to carve out for himself an idyllic existence, 
is unmasked and brought to trial. Kleinig claims that he deserves to suffer even 
though no good purpose is served by the suffering. According to Kleinig-and I 
agree-that someone deserves to suffer implies that if he suffers he is not justified 
in complaining: no wrong has been done to him, but it may still be wrong for 
certain persons to inflict the deserved suffering on him. Kleinig thinks it possible 
that it "would be improper for a state to inflict it"35, but he does not appear to 
think it possible that it might not be right for anyone to inflict it, not just for a 
state, and not just because no one has the necessary authority to do so. For it may 
be that, even though criminals deserve to suffer , under certain conditions the inflic­
tion of suffering on those who deserve it is socially undesirable, because of the con­
sequences it has for others. 
To return to our context: when the crime rate is low, the retributivist need not 
consider the criminogenic dimension of the institution by which the deprivation is 
administered to criminals. But if during a period of rising crime rates there is evi­
dence that these retributive institutions have significant criminogcn ir. effects. 36 
particularly when the community spends little money on their administration, then 
in order for the continuation of the practice to be justified the comparatively harm­
less proposition that the criminal deserves to suffer must be strengthened into some­
thing like 'let (retributive) justice be done even if the heavens fall'. When people 
adhere to such "ultimate" principles based on their intuitions, in the face of evi­
dence that adhering to them contributes to disasters, it becomes justifiable to ex­
pose the psychological springs which might make such principles so irresistibly 
attractive to them. In the remainder of the paper I want to spell out two hunches 
about these psychological springs. My first hunch is that R.T. is most attractive to 
people of a certain quasi-Hobbesian psychological type and that retribution would 
perhaps be justifiable also as the primary function of any social measure for coping 
with crime (not just as the primary function of punishment) if all or most criminals 
were of that psychological type. My second hunch is that the claim that the crimin­
al deserves to suffer, in the strong sense, which implies that he ought to be made 
to suffer, can be derived by a quasi-Hobbesian line of argument from certain quasi­
Hobbesian psychological assumptions about human nature. 
My first hunch is about the psychology of those who find R.T. attractive. To 
formulate my hunch, I need to introduce a classification of possible attitudes to­
wards crime and the criminal law. 37 I first distinguish three main groups: 
(1) The unconditional conformists, i.e., those who conform to the law what­
ever society does about law-breakers. Society need not do anything about this 
group (if indeed it has any members) since they will never break the law anyway. 
(2) The unconditional non-conformists, i.e., those who will break the law 
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whatever society does about crime as long as they arc physically capable of doing 
so. As I have already mentioned, it is now widely believed that the bulk of crimes 
against the person and property is committed by members of this group during 
their active career of crime. About them society can do nothing to reduce their 
criminal output except to incapacitate them, either by keeping them in prison, 
executing them, or mutilating them, e.g., cutting off their hands (as I believe is still 
done in rertain Arab states) or castrating them, as is done in some Western countries. 
(3) The conditional conformists, i.e., those who will conform when society 
adopts certain measures against crime, but will not conform when it adopts others. 
(3a) The ca1culating offenders, i.e., those who break the law whenever doing 
so promises them a net gain, whether pecuniary or psychic. 38 This group of cal­
culating rational egoistic criminals (organized crime, white collar crime) will not 
commit crimes if the cost of committing crimes is raised so as to make criminality 
unprofitable. This can be done by raising the certainity and severity of punishment. 
This group of criminals provides the strongest support for the general deterrence 
theory, i.e., the theory which holds that the intermediate primary function of any 
crime reduction measure is to deter potential criminals. 
(3b) The desperate offenders, i.e., those who wish to conform if conformity is 
compatible with the solution of their major daily problems (e.g., getting food, drugs, 
and whatever else they need to keep going), but who cannot solve these problems 
except by breaking the law. This group of criminals provides the strongest support 
for the rehabilitation theory, i.e., the theory which says that the intermediate pri­
mary function of any crime reduction measure is to reform or rehabilitate those 
who have committed crimes. 39 
(3c) The resentful offenders, i.e., those who wish to conform, but are deter­
mined not to conform if others don't, and who believe that others will conform if 
criminals are punished, i.e., taught the lesson that crime does not pay, or are given 
a taste of their own medicine.40 
It seems clear that theorists ,who think of the typical criminal as belonging to 
(3a) will be attracted to the deterrence theory, those who think of him a> bel�to 
(3b) to the rehabilitation theory, and those who think of him as belonging to (3c) 
to the retributive theory. What's more, people tend to think of their own general 
motivational patterns as characteristic of human nature. They will therefore tend 
to think of criminals as being like themselves (though they will not necessarily put 
it to themselves in these words). Hence they will tend to favor the theories best 
suited ·to deal with criminals of the psychological type to which they themselves 
belong. 
I conclude this first point with some speculations about what would be a ration­
al response to crime. If a rising crime rate makes it unwise to ignore the question 
of how to keep crime in check, and if at the same time it is impossible or 
unjust to deal differentially with psy chologically different criminals, that is, 
if the society has to choose a single type of response to crime,41 then the 
rational way to choose would seem to be to assess the relative size of these 
groups, and pick the method which has the best overall effect on the crime rate. 
One of the most troublesome questions here will be the 'following. One may for 
instance want to adopt a mixed method, say, combining a policy of deterrence with 
a policy of negative retributivism. The problem, then, is this. Suppose insisting on 
depriving the criminal would interfere with his rehabilitation or that setting an 
upper bound to the severity of punishment according to the gravity of the crime 
would interfere with the deterrent or incapacitative effect, would it be morally 
permissible to set aside this requirement? H.L.A. Hart would think the former but 
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not the latter, while Bradley, under the influence of Darwinism, thought the latter 
but not the former. The matter is complicated by the probability that the social 
order is unjust and that some criminals are driven into crime by such injustices. At 
the same time, one's concern for the protection of the rights of criminals should 
not blind one to the force of the argument that a negative retributivist strategy of 
punishing (limiting the severity of the penalty by the gravity of the crime) which 
has very poor results in terms of deterrence is an injustice to potential innocent 
victims including the criminal himself on future occasions, when he may be a victim. 
My second hunch concerns the reason why the claim that criminals deserve to 
suffer seems so obvious to so many. My hunch is that this claim in its strong sense, 
meaning that criminals ought to be made to suffer, can be made plausible by a type 
of Hobbesian argument if we assume that limited good will is a feature of all or 
most men. The steps of such an argument might be set out as follows:12 
(a) Everybody has more to gain than to lose from being a member of a soc· 
iety, with clearly spelled out rules of conduct. 
(b) It is in everyone's interest if the social order prohibits only conduct which 
inflicts significant harm on others, for only in that case does the society provide the 
maximal desirable security and the maximal desirable freedom. 
( c) Everybody has adequate reason to want to be a member in good rather 
than a member in bad standing, i.e., with all of a member's rights fully protected 
rather than some suspended, since he is necessarily better off in the former than in 
the latter case. 
( d) But everyone has adequate reason to want there to be adequate sanctions 
in support of the requirements of the social order, for (i) anyone is better off if he 
is not the victim of a crime, yet (ii) anyone can on occasion benefit himself by 
committing a crime and may, therefore, (for all that others may be able to ascer· 
tain) be tempted to commit one, but (iii) the existence of adequate sanctions would 
disincline such potential criminals from committing a crime. 
(e) Sanctions are adequate if and only if they correspond in severity to the 
gravity of the violation, for only such sanctions teach the criminal the required 
lesson of what it is to suffer the harm inflicted by his crime. This lesson consists in 
what is often called "giving the criminal a taste of his own medicine". It is what 
underlies the lex talionis. Of course, it need not be the same medicine, "the same 
taste" is enough. 
(f) Therefore everyone has adequate reason to want criminals made to suffer 
by the application of adequate sanctions. 
If this line of reasoning is sound, then under the conditions envisaged criminals 
deserve and ought to be made to suffer by the application of social sanctions fash­
i o ned in accordance with the principles of retribution. And those who have already 
committed one have done so contrary to reason. Hence they cannot in reason deny 
that there is adequate reason for anyone including themselves to want there to be 
such adequate sanctions, or that criminals deserve to suffer. 
It seems to me than an argument such as this one confronts the retributivist 
with a dilemna. If the argument is sound or if it can be made sound by some mod­
ification, then we do not need a basic retributivist intuition, but can make the cen­
tral claim of retributivism hinge on the deterrentist premiss (above (d,iii) and (e)) : 
that sanctions of a certain magnitude do jn fact deter. Or else, if the argument is not 
sound, if, for instance, such sanctions do not in fact deter or disincline the poten­
tial criminals, if the central retributivist claim is based only on intuition, then the 
central retributivist owes us an answer to the question why, if non-retributive re-
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sponses to crime (such as deterrence and incapacitation) are more effective ways of 
bringing down the crime rate, this is morally irrelevant; why the claims of the 
potential innocent victims need not concern the moralist. 
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